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THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 
TRUST AND THE GULF COAST 
CLAIMS FACILITY: THE 
“SUPERFUND” MYTH AND THE LAW 
OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
ALFRED R. LIGHT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two months after the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion, BP 
and the Obama White House announced the creation of the $20 billion 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust (“the Trust”) to pay individuals and 
businesses suffering losses arising from the disaster.1 Although BP 
initially paid certain claimants, Kenneth R. Feinberg, a Washington 
lawyer who previously administered the 9/11 Compensation Fund, 
opened the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“the Facility” or GCCF) in 
August to “independently” resolve disaster claims against BP.2 As 
publicly advertised, the Facility and the $20 billion Trust, to which it has 
* Professor of Law and Director, LL.M—Environmental Sustainability, St. Thomas University 
School of Law, Miami Gardens, Florida. This Article reflects events as of January 18, 2011. Readers 
should understand that in this rapidly evolving area, inferences and conclusions have a “date-time 
group.” The author thanks Professor Paul Kibel, Golden Gate University School of Law, and 
Secretary George Sheldon, Department of Children and Families, State of Florida, for help along the 
way in producing this Article. Any errors or omissions, however, are the author’s own. 
 1 Jesse Lee, A New Process and a New Escrow Account for Gulf Coast Claims from BP, 
THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG, (June 17, 2010, 2:35 PM EDT), 
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/17/a-new-process-and-a-new-escrow-account-gulf-oil-spill-
claims-bp; see also Alfred R. Light, Designing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in the Shadow of the 
Law: A Template from the Superfund §301(e) Report, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
11,121 (2010). 
 2 The evolution of this facility and its first months of operations are described in some detail 
in Light, supra note 1, at 11,121-23. 
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access to pay claims, are designed to address claims by individuals and 
businesses but do not cover governmental claims for cleanup costs, lost 
revenues, or natural resource damages.3 
The Superfund “myth” is that a trust fund would compensate 
victims expeditiously and avoid (or at least defer) litigation over the 
liability of potentially responsible parties.4 The myth of the GCCF 
created last year is the same – those injured by the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster will be compensated expeditiously without the delays and costs 
associated with litigation.5 This Article explores some of the issues 
present in the GCCF context that are analogous to those that appeared 
during the formative years of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA’s 
unfortunate realities need not be the GCCF’s realities, at least not 
entirely. CERCLA is a law of unintended consequences, where the quest 
for quick compensation and remedial response (“shovels first, lawsuits 
later”6) became a ponderous litigation-oriented regime with high 
transaction costs. This Article identifies potential unintended and 
undesired consequences for the GCCF by exploring the surrounding 
myths, with the hope that by doing so, some of those consequences 
experienced under CERCLA may be avoided. 
Part II explores the myth of the Superfund, examining the 
similarities between CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 
which is directly implicated in the Deepwater Horizon Disaster. Part III 
compares and contrasts the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust 
Agreement, which establishes the $20 billion Trust with BP money and 
authorizes expenditures related to the incident, with the protocols now 
governing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility administered by Feinberg. Part 
 3 See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/proto_4.php (last 
visited July 5, 2011) (indicating the claims not covered by the facility include government claims, 
real estate broker/agent claims, and the Gulf Coast Restoration and Protection Foundation (e.g., Rig 
Worker Assistance Fund)). 
 4 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (Westlaw 2011). “Superfund” refers to the fund 
created by Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA) to address abandoned hazardous waste sites. Id. at § 9601(11). 
 5 Early on, Feinberg elaborated his philosophy in a speech to the Economic Club of 
Washington: “Under this program, you will receive, if you’re eligible, compensation without having 
to go to court for years, without the uncertainty of going to court, since I’ll be much more generous 
than any court will be. At the same time, you won’t have to pay lawyers and costs.” See John 
Pacenti, Plaintiffs Attorneys Knock BP Fund Administrator, DAILY BUS. REV. (July 26, 2010), 
available at www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202463865302&src=EMC-Email&et=editorial&bu= 
Law.com&pt=LAWCOM%20Newswire&cn=NW_20100726&kw=Plaintiffs%20Attorneys%20Kno
ck%20BP%20Fund%20Administrator. 
 6 See DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA’S TOXIC 
POLICY FOR THE 1990’S 29 (1992) (quoting Ann Bowman). 
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IV compares aspects of CERCLA’s and OPA’s liability regimes, 
focusing on affirmative and partial defenses, the role of causation 
(especially proximate cause), the equitable allocation of responsibility 
among liable parties, and the related issue of the effect of partial 
settlements. Part V hones in on the ultimate critical issue – the 
competition among various categories of claimants, including the federal 
government, states, local governments, private businesses, and 
individuals, for BP’s money. Finally, Part VI shows how the GCCF has 
evolved while unintended consequences of the Facility’s original design 
have surfaced and continue to exist. 
II. THE “MYTH” OF SUPERFUND 
“Myth” has two definitions. It can refer to “a belief, opinion, or 
theory that is not based on fact or reality,” so that “to mythologize” can 
mean to invent or to make up stories that are false.7 In this sense, to 
mythologize may appear to refer to deception. On the other hand, a 
“myth” can be “a legend or story, usually one that attempts to account for 
something in nature.”8 Most myths express a religious belief of a people 
and are of unknown origin. Here, to mythologize can be a genuine 
attempt to explain. To “mythologize” may be to “construct” a myth or to 
“relate and explain” the myth from a critical perspective.9 
CERCLA’s “myth” lies somewhere between these two definitions. 
After the Love Canal disaster in the 1970’s, the “lame duck” compromise 
that created CERCLA deleted the toxic-tort cause of action for private 
entities in the Senate Bill and focused the “compromise” scheme on 
cleanup and natural resource damages.10 The bill created the so-called 
Section 301(e) Study Group (“Group”) to develop recommendations for 
Congress regarding a private cause of action.11 That Group ended up 
recommending against extending Superfund to cover private damage 
claims or creating a new private federal cause of action for damages. 
Instead, it recommended a federal administrative compensation scheme 
for those claims, coupled with state reforms of toxic-tort law.12 
CERCLA’s procedure to allow claims against the Superfund largely has 
been unimplemented with respect to cleanup costs and unavailable with 
 7 24 WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 1377 (1990). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW & PROCEDURE 12-18 (1991). 
 11 42 U.S.C.A. § 9651(e) (Westlaw 2011). 
 12 See Alfred R. Light, A Comparison of the 301(e) Report and Pending Legislative 
Proposals, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,133 (1984). 
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respect to private damage claims. 
GCCF’s “myth” parallels that of CERCLA. Following the Exxon 
Valdez disaster in the 1980’s, the OPA amended the Clean Water Act to 
expand the trust fund not only to cover cleanup costs and damages to 
natural resources, but also to pay claims for damages to private parties 
that were unsuccessful in settling with liable actors.13 OPA is different 
from CERCLA, though, in that it permits recovery from either the 
responsible party or the fund for damages to real or personal property, 
subsistence use of natural resources, lost profits and earning capacity, 
and public services up to a legislative cap of $75 million (except where 
an incident was proximately caused by gross negligence or willful 
misconduct, or by a violation of federal law).14 Like CERCLA, however, 
OPA excludes claims for personal injury from its recovery regime.15 
Both regimes are, in part, false promises. Both systems purport to 
establish a regime in which private claims may be paid by a federal fund. 
Section 112 of CERCLA authorizes the Hazardous Substances 
Superfund to pay private claims submitted for natural resource damages 
and cleanup costs that are consistent with the national contingency 
plan.16 The claimant must present a claim to the potentially responsible 
party sixty days before making a claim against the Superfund.17 In effect, 
this provision has never been implemented. Although the Environmental 
Protection Agency has at various times over the past thirty years stated 
that the claims procedure might be used in connection with “mixed fund” 
settlements, this has never been a significant feature of the Superfund.18 
Both the Hazardous Substances Superfund and the Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund have been used almost exclusively to pay for cleanup costs 
rather than damages. 
Even without this dysfunction, payments from OPA’s Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund would likely be an unrealistic remedy for those 
injured by the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Claims submitted to the fund 
had to be presented to the responsible party at least ninety days before 
 13 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2762 (Westlaw 2011). 
 14 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b) (Westlaw 2011). 
 15 See generally 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (Westlaw 2011); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (Westlaw 2011). 
 16 42 U.S.C.A. § 9612 (Westlaw 2011). 
 17 42 U.S.C.A. § 9612(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 18 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(b) (Westlaw 2011); Memorandum from J. Winston Porter, Assistant 
Admin., Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, & Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Admin., 
Office of Enforcement & Compliance Monitoring, to Regional Administrators, Regions I-X, on 
Evaluating Mixed Funding Settlements Under CERCLA (Oct. 20, 1987), available at 
www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/mixfnd-cercla-mem.pdf. 
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submission to the fund.19 But Deepwater Horizon immediately disrupted 
the livelihoods of fishermen, shrimpers, and Gulf-dependent businesses 
enough that their subsistence could have been grievously harmed within 
the mandatory ninety-day window for the responsible party’s 
“consideration” of claims. Given the massive scale of the disaster, it was 
obvious that damages would rapidly exceed the $75 million cap on 
liability.20 
III. DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL TRUST VS. GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY 
A careful reading of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust 
agreement between BP and the trustees reveals a disparity between the 
scope of the Facility and the Trust. While the agreement plainly excludes 
the federal government’s claims for response costs from payments out of 
the Trust, it just as plainly includes authority for the Trustees to pay 
amounts settled by BP outside the GCCF, natural resource damages 
claims (including assessment costs), and state and local government 
response costs.21 
Natural resource damages claims, while uncertain, will probably be 
enormous.22 Since all state and local government claims are eligible for 
payment from the Trust, some states fear that any restrictions included in 
the GCCF for payment of individual and business claims might be 
applied to them as well.23 The scope of the Trust Agreement also 
 19 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(c) (Westlaw 2011). 
 20 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a)(3) (Westlaw 2011). BP Exploration and Production advised 
Judge Carl Barbier that when handling the consolidated multidistrict litigation over the Deepwater 
Horizon spill that it is “waiving” the $75 million statutory limit on liability under the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 for damage claims from the spill. BP Waives $75 Million Limit on Liability for Damage 
Claims from Gulf Oil Spill, 25 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 1096 (2010). Transocean, however, has said 
its liability is limited under the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. Id. On November 12, 2010, 
GAO released a report on the Gulf oil spill that said Congress should change the $1 billion per-
incident cap on spending from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund for a single spill. GAO Calls on 
Congress to Revise $1 Billion Cap on Oil Spill Trust Fund, 218 DAILY ENV’T REP. (BNA) A-10 
(Nov. 15, 2010). 
 21 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust 1 (Aug. 6, 2010) (on file with author). 
 22 See e.g., Gulf Damages Assessment in Early Stages: Officials Say Full Accounting Years 
Away, 142 DAILY REP. FOR EXECS. (BNA) A-36 (July 28, 2010) (reporting natural resources 
trustee testimony before Senate subcommittee on July 27); see generally Michael P. Coglianese, The 
Importance of Determining Chronic Natural Resource Damages from the Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,100 (2010). 
 23 See Letter from Robert A. Butterworth, Jim Smith, Eugene E. Sterns, and Daniel J. Gerber, 
Florida Deepwater Horizon Legal Group, to Hon. Charlie Crist and Attorney General McCollum 8 
(July 19, 2010), quoted in Alfred R. Light, Protocols for the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: An 
Etiquette of Equivocation, 25 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 985, 988-89 (Sept. 23, 2010). 
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explains equivocation in early draft protocols for the Facility about 
whether the GCCF is the only way to present a claim to BP for payment 
before proceeding with legal remedies under the OPA.24 The Trust 
Agreement clearly authorizes payments from the Trust where BP has 
settled claims outside the GCCF that “relate to the Oil Spill.”25 The 
revised protocol released on November 22, 2010, provides, “Under OPA 
a claimant must file a claim with BP or the GCCF for OPA damages 
prior to seeking payment from the National Pollution Fund Center or 
commencing an action in court.”26 Therefore, a claimant does not have to 
use the GCCF for presentation of claims to BP.27 The GCCF is simply an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism that is totally voluntary, and 
“participation in the GCCF shall not affect any right that the Claimant 
would have had absent such participation until final resolution of the 
claim is achieved.”28 Despite this clarification in the protocol, GCCF 
takes the position in its FAQs that all claims after August 23, 2010, 
“must be filed with the GCCF,” rather than with BP.29 
Of course, the GCCF’s $20 billion Trust is neither a cap nor a floor 
on BP’s liabilities.30 If BP is successful in showing that the company is 
not at fault (or has lesser fault than Halliburton, Anadarko, or 
Transocean), the Trust, or BP by way of subrogation, might be able to 
recover some of the $20 billion that funds the GCCF from those parties 
in indemnification or contribution litigation. As of late December 2010, 
GCCF had denied more claims than it had paid. In fact, it paid only about 
$2.5 billion of the $20 billion authorized for the Fund.31 In addition to 
 24 See Light, supra note 23, at 988. 
 25 The Trust refers to these as “Other Resolved Claims.” Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, 
supra note 21. 
 26 Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, GULF COAST CLAIMS 
FACILITY (Feb. 8, 2011), www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/proto_4. 
 27 The November 22 protocol thus confirms the conclusion stated in my article this past 
September. Light, supra note 23, at 988 (“In my opinion, the Emergency Advance Protocol 
equivocates about whether a claimant must present his final claim to GCCF before suing BP. Its 
clarification can be read to permit a claimant to present his or her claim to BP and settle the claim 
outside the GCCF (and, if BP refuses to settle, sue).”). 
 28 Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 26, ¶ I.A. 
 29 Frequently Asked Questions, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, 
www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq (last visited July 13, 2011) (“As of August 23, 2010, all claims 
must be filed with the GCCF. The GCCF has replaced the BP claims process. Individuals and 
Businesses should no longer present claims to BP.”). 
 30 See, e.g., Jean Helwege, The Gulf Oil Spill: Social Versus Legal Obligations Facing BP, 7 
THE SCITECH LAWYER 6 (Winter 2011). 
 31 BP, CLAIMS AND GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL PUBLIC 
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this amount, the GCCF had allocated $41.5 million to state real estate 
organizations for their payments to real estate brokers and agents—
groups that GCCF declined to pay directly because it refused to 
acknowledge the validity of this type of claim on an individual basis.32 
BP had paid another $1.6 billion to governments, mainly for cleanup 
costs.33 At the end of 2010, GCCF administrator Kenneth Feinberg 
speculated that $10 billion would be enough to compensate claims filed 
with the Trust.34 BP’s stock rose toward the end of 2010 when it became 
apparent that Trust expenditures were lower than anticipated.35 
Ultimately, BP will likely pay out much more than $20 billion in 
connection with the spill. One calculation by the Wall Street Journal 
indicates that stock market participants expect the incident to cost BP 
shareholders more than $50 billion.36 In 2010, BP began to sell some 
large assets as part of its efforts to raise up to $30 billion to help pay for 
the spill.37 However, it could also be part of a strategy to “reduce BP’s 
empire” in ultimate anticipation of a bankruptcy filing in several years 
under which it would reorganize, similar to asbestos manufacturers.38 In 
January 2011, BP made Russian oil giant OAO Rosneft its largest 
stockholder in a $16 billion share swap.39 Rosneft is state-owned. Under 
the deal, the two firms will form a joint operating company—two-thirds 
owned by Rosneft and a third by BP—to explore for oil in the Arctic 
Circle.40 Making another sovereign, particularly Russia, its largest 
 32 Id.; see also Ian Urbina, BP Settlements Likely to Shield Top Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 20, 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/us/20spill.html?_r=1&ref=ianurbina; 
Light, supra note 1, at 11,126. 
 33 BP, supra note 31. 
 34 James Herron, A Good Week for BP, but It Still Faces Long Road to Recovery, THE 
SOURCE, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2011, 11:04 AM GMT), blogs.wsj.com/source/2011/01/07/a-good-
week-for-bp-but-it-still-faces-long-road-to-recovery/?KEYWORDS=oil+pollution++liability+limit; 
James Herron, BP Shares Rise as Spill Cost Seen Lower, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2011, available at 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704723104576061332735278932.html. 
 35 Andrea Tryphonides & Colin Ng, BP Resurgence Helps Push FTSE Up 1.9%, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 4, 2011, available at online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870472310457606 
2300209162130.html (“BP jumped 5.9% following reports that compensation payouts for the Gulf 
oil spill may be much lower than expected. Continued speculation that it is a takeover target also 
aided BP.”). 
 36 Helwege, supra note 30, at 6. 
 37 Guy Chazan, BP to Sell Canadian Natural-Gas Operation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2010, 
available at online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704098304576021722396486948.html? 
KEYWORDS=bp+sell+asset. 
 38 See Helwege, supra note 30, at 7. 
 39 Guy Chazan, BP, Rosneft Deal Draws Criticism, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2011, available at 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704511404576085932247348132.html?KEYWORDS=b
p+stock. 
 40 Id. 
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shareholder certainly complicates any U.S. court’s management of a 
potential BP bankruptcy. Such arrangements also raise the prospect of 
another “channel for avoiding listing all the assets of BP in a Chapter 11 
case – to file at the holding company level and leave the subsidiaries out 
of the equation.”41 Just as Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco shed their food 
businesses as they faced unfavorable tobacco-litigation outcomes, BP 
might further complicate and possibly limit its liability through corporate 
reorganization.42 
IV. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The parallels between CERCLA and OPA in the context of 
Deepwater Horizon go far beyond the core myth of a Superfund 
alternative to litigation. The role of proof that a “standard of care” has 
been violated is another parallel between the two regimes. CERCLA 
actually incorporates the strict liability of the Clean Water Act’s earlier 
“oil and hazardous substance liability” regime through incorporation by 
reference of 33 U.S.C. § 1321.43 OPA uses the same incorporation by 
reference.44 At the time of CERCLA’s enactment in 1980, several courts 
had construed the standard under this cross-referenced provision of the 
Clean Water Act to be a strict-liability standard.45 The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) noted this in its “legislative history” letter to 
Representative James J. Florio (D.N.J.), floor leader for CERCLA in the 
House.46 
As all good torts students know, making CERCLA and OPA “strict 
liability” regimes does not necessarily eliminate the issue of a 
defendant’s due care from a court’s consideration. CERCLA contains an 
affirmative defense for defendants who prove that a release is solely 
caused by an act or omission of an unrelated third party and that its own 
 41 Helwege, supra note 30, at 7. 
 42 Id.; see also Guy Chazan, Rosneft Tie-Up Shows BP’s Ability to Deal After Spill, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011, available at online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704029704576088153707130740.html?mod=WSJ_Energy_leftHeadlines 
(“Stan Polevets . . . said under the shareholder agreement between BP and AAR, TNK-BP should 
hold the shares in Rosneft, not BP.”). 
 43 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(32) (Westlaw 2011) (incorporating “the standard of liability which 
obtains under section 1321 of Title 33”). 
 44 33 U.S.C.A. § 2701(17) (Westlaw 2011) (incorporating “the standard of liability which 
obtains under section 1321 of this title”). 
 45 See e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979); 
Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977). 
 46 126 CONG. REC. H11, 788 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980), reprinted in 1, A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY 
ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND) 780 (1983). 
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conduct was not negligent.47 OPA does the same.48 Both statutes reverse 
the burden of proof on the standard of care. However, both defenses are 
also ephemeral because the third party causing the response costs or 
damages cannot have a contractual relationship with the defendant.49 The 
“contractual relationship” eliminating the defense does not have to relate 
to the operation leading to the release, but can instead simply be “land 
contracts, deeds, easements, leases, or other instruments transferring title 
or possession” of the property.50 Where there is a “contractual 
relationship,” separate proof that the defendant “exercised due care with 
respect to the oil . . . in light of all relevant facts and circumstances” is 
insufficient to establish the defense.51 
More importantly, even in the usual circumstance where no 
affirmative defense is available to a defendant, negligence considerations 
are relevant to limitations of a defendant’s liability where there is more 
than one responsible party and liability may be apportioned. In the 
CERCLA context, the United States Supreme Court recently clarified, in 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, that under 
applicable Restatement principles, a defendant’s liability can be limited 
if the defendant shows a reasonable basis for apportionment of an 
indivisible harm.52 However, the Burlington Northern principle avoiding 
so-called “joint and several” liability is limited to situations where two 
defendants “acting independently” cause a release.53 Put another way, 
the principle applies only when the damages caused by one liable party 
are “divisible” from the damages caused by another liable party. 
Limitation of liability is a determination of causation. “Damages can be 
divided by causation when any person or group of persons to whom the 
fact finder assigns a percentage of responsibility (or any tortuous act of 
such a person) was a legal cause of less than the entire damages.”54 Thus, 
with CERCLA, the government learned (albeit over twenty-eight years 
after CERCLA’s enactment) that causation determinations may not be 
 47 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
 48 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(a)(3) (Westlaw 2011). 
 49 Id.; 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3). 
 50 33 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (Westlaw 2011) (OPA); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35) (Westlaw 
2011) (CERCLA). 
 51 See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2011) (OPA); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) 
(Westlaw 2011) (CERCLA). 
 52 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009); see also 
Alfred R. Light, Restatement of Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA After Burlington 
Northern, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,058 (2009). 
 53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 (2000); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 879, 881 (1965). 
 54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. a (2000). 
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entirely avoided even though “CERCLA . . . does not require causation 
as a prerequisite to liability.”55 In addition, another line of CERCLA 
decisions establishes that “release . . . which causes the incurrence of 
response costs” in the statute’s liability provision means that “[p]roof of 
a causal link between a defendant’s release and the plaintiff’s 
response . . . forms one of the ‘basic elements’ of a plaintiff’s prima facie 
case under CERCLA.”56 
In some respects, Burlington’s “joint and several” jurisprudence has 
no direct relevance to Deepwater Horizon since the contributions of the 
various known defendants to the chain of events causing the spill are not 
independent of one another. More traditional justifications for the 
imposition of joint and several liability associated with persons acting in 
concert apply.57 For example, in some circumstances the employer of an 
independent contractor may be liable for acts of the contractor.58 More 
generally, the decisions are relevant in their emphasis on the necessary 
role of causation (or “nexus”) as a feature of the liability determination. 
At some point, “adding to the penalties of the statute by making the 
defendant liable for an unrelated harm could result in over deterrence.”59 
As Professor Marshall Shapo has noted, “What is important, in the end, 
is that courts keep in mind not only the ‘purpose’ of a particular statute, 
but the purposes of the law of torts.”60 
Interestingly, both CERCLA and OPA contain presumptive 
monetary caps on damages recovery, as opposed to cleanup costs. Under 
CERCLA § 107(c), the trustee may not recover in excess of $50 million 
unless a showing is made that the release resulted from willful 
misconduct or willful negligence, or from a violation of federal safety or 
operating standards.61 While OPA raises the cap to $75 million for OPA 
spills and implicitly expands the cap’s coverage by expanding the 
definition of recoverable damages, its wording is the same as 
 55 United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 937 (9th Cir. 2008), 
rev’d on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009). 
 56 Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1223, 1224 (D. Mass. 1988), 
rev’d on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 1989); see 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (Westlaw 
2011); see also ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.2.7, at 80-82 (1991). 
 57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 15 (2000) 
(“When persons are liable because they acted in concert, all persons are jointly and severally liable 
for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to each person engaged in concerted activity.”); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979). 
 58 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416-429 (1965). 
 59 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 131 (1983). 
 60 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW ¶ 56.05 (1998). 
 61 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c) (Westlaw 2011). 
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CERCLA’s.62 If a defendant sought to enforce such caps, it is unclear 
what effect that assertion would ultimately have, given the broad savings 
provisions for state-law causes of action. CERCLA’s savings clause 
reads, “Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any way the 
obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or State law, 
including common law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances 
or other pollutants or contaminants.”63 OPA’s is similarly broad: 
“Nothing in this Act . . . shall . . . affect, or be construed or interpreted to 
affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person 
under . . . State law, including common law.”64 OPA’s savings clause 
plainly preserves state laws that establish liability rules and financial 
requirements relating to oil spills.65 Therefore, any plaintiff, other than 
possibly the federal government, may assert a cause of action for 
recovery outside the strictures of CERCLA or OPA. 
In January 2011, the Presidential Commission investigating the BP 
spill concluded it was an avoidable disaster that resulted from 
management failures by BP and its contractors.66 Strangely, investors 
interpreted this Report as reducing the likelihood that BP would be found 
guilty of gross negligence.67 By pointing to systemic failures in the 
system of oil exploration and regulation, BP was also seen as having a 
better chance of “clawing back” some of the costs from its contract 
partners, Anadarko and MOEX Offshore 2007.68 Professor David 
Uhlmann, former chief of the DOJ’s Environmental Crimes Section, 
nonetheless concluded that there may be a basis for criminal liability 
under existing Clean Water Act case law, even though BP’s conduct was 
not gross negligence.69 
A. CAUSATION 
Like CERCLA, OPA requires that the plaintiff incurring cleanup 
 62 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 63 42 U.S.C.A. § 9652(d) (Westlaw 2011). 
 64 33 U.S.C.A. § 2718(a)(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
 65 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000); see also Askew v. Am. Waterways 
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). 
 66 Stephen Power & Ben Casselman, White House Probe Blames BP, Industry in Gulf Blast, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2011, available at online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704405704576064122843672118.html. 
 67 Guy Chazan, BP Gets Lift from Oil-Spill Report, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2011, available at 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576065602870469870.html. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.; see also David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, 
Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413 (2011). 
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costs in connection with a spill establish that the costs “result from such 
incident.”70 While specific costs sought may be disputed, the CERCLA 
experience suggests that courts may be quite deferential to plaintiffs who 
have incurred such costs with the expectation of reimbursement.71 
CERCLA’s limitation of private recovery for response costs 
distinguishes CERCLA from OPA, which provides for various forms of 
private damages recovery.72 However, both statutes permit governmental 
trustees to recover natural resource damages.73 Litigation under 
CERCLA’s natural resource damages provision may be an indicator of 
how “causation” determinations under OPA should be resolved. 
In interpreting CERCLA liability in the natural resource damages 
context, some courts have made reference to common-law causation 
standards. For example, in Ohio v. U.S. Department of the Interior,74 the 
court concluded the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) position that the 
traditional common-law standard of causation should be applied was a 
permissible reading of the statute.75 Consequently, trustees must be able 
to meet traditional causation standards when showing that a particular 
spill or release caused or was at least a “contributing factor” to a 
particular injury.76 The DOI’s Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
regulations require that trustees determine the baseline condition of the 
injured resource and then compare that baseline with the injured status of 
the resource to quantify injury.77 “Baseline” is defined as “the condition 
or conditions that would have existed at the assessment area had the 
discharge of oil or release of the hazardous substance under investigation 
 70 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
 71 United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1249-1250 (9th Cir. 2005) (costs 
include indirect costs calculated with a “full cost” methodology). 
 72 See e.g., Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming disallowance of 
costs of physical site maintenance, damage caused during asbestos removal, activities of counsel, 
medical monitoring, survey of contaminated ditch); Vine St., LLC v. Keeling, 460 F. Supp. 2d 728, 
758 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (economic damages not corresponding to work closely related to cleanup 
activities, such as lost rent, diminution of property value, attorney’s fees related to litigation and 
experts’ fees, were not CERCLA response costs recoverable on property owner’s contribution 
claim); cf. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (b)(2)(B)-(C),(E) (Westlaw 2011) (recoverable damages by private 
parties). 
 73 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2011) (OPA); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C) 
(Westlaw 2011). 
 74 Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1124 (D. Idaho 
2003) (requiring use of “contributing factor” causation test in natural resource damages action by 
native American tribe and United States against mining companies). 
 77 See generally 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (Westlaw 2011). 
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not occurred.”78 While a trustee has the burden of determining the 
baseline, defendants are supposed to ensure that the trustee is apprised of 
all appropriate conditions or factors impacting the resource other than the 
spill.79 
Closely related to causation in natural resource damages cases is the 
requirement that the plaintiff carefully articulate the injury. For example, 
in New Mexico v. General Electric Company,80 the court was not 
satisfied that the plaintiffs validated their assumptions that water affected 
by contamination could be used absent the contamination and that any 
loss of use would be permanent.81 Proving an injury to a natural resource 
is not the same as proving what amount of damages should be 
recoverable. Under CERCLA, any recovery obtained by a trustee of 
natural resources must be used “to restore, replace, or acquire the 
equivalent” of the injured natural resource.82 
Since the GCCF protocols are directed exclusively to claims by 
private individuals and businesses and do not encompass governmental 
claims for natural resource damages, the causation requirement discussed 
above is not addressed directly in the GCCF protocol. The GCCF, 
however, has stuck to the original position in its drafts that it will only 
“pay for harm or damage that is proximately caused by the Spill.”83 Use 
of “proximately caused” has been controversial. Based on the language 
of OPA, some have argued that the statute’s causation requirement is 
more relaxed than the traditional common-law principle. For example, 
several attorneys general claim that OPA does not require proximate 
cause and have urged Feinberg to clarify that it applies only to personal 
injury claims not compensable under OPA.84 In the final protocol, 
Feinberg simply concludes, “The GCCF’s causation determinations of 
OPA claims will be guided by OPA and federal law interpreting OPA.”85 
Earlier discussions of the BP claims process were more specific about 
the nexus requirements GCCF would apply. For example, the drafters 
referenced criteria such as proximity to the coast, dependence of the 
plaintiff on the natural resources harmed by the spill, and a hierarchy of 
 78 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (Westlaw 2011). 
 79 See 43 C.F.R. § 11.15 (Westlaw 2011). 
 80 N.M. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1212 (D.N.M. 2004). 
 81 Id. 
 82 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(f)(1) (Westlaw 2011). 
 83 Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 26, ¶ II.G. 
 84 Letter from Douglas M. Gansler, Joseph R. “Beau” Biden III, & Roy Cooper to Kenneth 
R. Feinberg 2 (July 22, 2010) (on file with author). 
 85 Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 26, ¶ II.G. 
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industries most clearly affected.86 Until courts clarify OPA’s nexus 
requirements, the protocol simply avoids resolving the matter by rule, 
essentially deciding the question during case-by-case determinations that 
are not disclosed to nonparties.87 
These determinations have been critical to the wholesale denial of 
claims. The publicly stated reason for the large number of denials has 
been the lack of documentation for submitted claims. This explanation 
may cover a multitude of sins, but most of them are likely related to the 
proximate-cause requirement. The Deepwater Horizon Disaster took 
place in an unfortunate economic context for a region that was still 
recovering from the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. Census figures for 
Louisiana illustrate the relative loss of population arising out of that 
disaster. Thus, businesses along the Gulf had difficulty justifying “lost 
earnings or profits that were caused by the injury, destruction, or loss of 
specific property or natural resource as a result of the Spill.”88 The 
adjusters in Columbus, Ohio, associated with Feinberg’s firm might 
easily have looked askance at “comparable time periods” prior to 
Katrina. And of course, claimants are also required to report “income 
received from alternative employment or business during the period 
when the loss occurred” and “savings to overhead and other normal 
expenses not incurred as a result of the Spill.”89 
Claims for loss of real or personal property require documentation 
as proof that the claimant’s property was “physically damaged or 
destroyed as a result of the Spill.”90 Even individuals trying to 
demonstrate “lost earnings” need to show that their losses are a result of 
the spill. For example, a fisherman claiming lost income might have to 
show that his “fishing grounds have been closed as a result of the 
spill,”91 or a hotel or rental property owner might have to show that she 
has “decreased profits because beaches, swimming, or fishing areas have 
 86 Video: Claims Overview—Darryl Willis—7 July 2010, BP, bp.concerts.com/gom/ 
claimsoverviewdarrellwillis070710.htm. 
 87 Kenneth Feinberg said on October 27 that he will not use a geographic test to bar 
claimants and is seeking “the very best independent science” on the future of the Gulf of Mexico as 
the program moves to its second phase of offering final payments to claimants. Feinberg Says 
Distance from Spill Will Not Automatically Bar Compensation Fund Claims, 207 DAILY ENV’T 
REP. (BNA) A-9 (Oct. 28, 2010). 
 88 GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, PROTOCOL FOR EMERGENCY ADVANCE PAYMENTS 3 
(Aug. 23, 2010), available at www.tpcg.org/emgevents/pdf/AUGUST%2023%202010% 
20PROTOCOL%20_2.pdf (emphasis added). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 2. 
 91 Id. at 3. 
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been affected by the oil from the Spill.”92 Even those limiting their 
claims to removal and cleanup costs are expected to show “information 
or documentation explaining how the actions taken were necessary to 
prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from the Spill” and “that the 
actions taken were approved by the Federal On-Scene Coordinator or 
were consistent with the National Contingency Plan.”93 
In various public forums, Feinberg has complained that claimants 
have been unwilling or unable to provide tax returns documenting their 
pre-Spill income. He has promised to accept alternative documentation 
such as affidavits from employers or other trustworthy associates (e.g., a 
parish priest) to vouch for a claimant’s pre-Spill work history. A careful 
reading of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust agreement counsels 
careful consideration of these documentation methods. Under the 
agreement, the GCCF Paying Agent (initially Garden City Group, Inc.) 
prepares and processes IRS Forms 1099-MISC and 1042-S in respect to 
distributions from the Trust.94 These forms report to the IRS amounts 
subject to federal income tax. So, any shrimp-boat worker who 
overlooked his or her obligation to pay federal income taxes prior to the 
Spill will likely be contacted about such omissions when filing a 2011 
return in connection with payments received from the Trust in 2010. 
B. ALLOCATION OF EQUITABLE RESPONSIBILITY AMONG LIABLE 
PARTIES 
CERCLA’s lessons for the GCCF are not limited to matters of 
causation and documentation. The Deepwater Horizon disaster, like most 
CERCLA releases, involves more than one defendant (i.e., BP 
Exploration and Production, Inc.) who has chosen to settle claims. Even 
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust Agreement, which is broader than 
the GCCF, does not purport to be a settlement mechanism for claims by 
agencies of the federal government. Approximately 300 cases filed 
against BP, Transocean, and Halliburton have been consolidated as part 
of a multidistrict litigation in the Eastern District of Louisiana for 
purposes of pretrial discovery.95 Inevitably, the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster will result in a need to resolve the same procedural and 
substantive issues that have been addressed in multi-party CERCLA 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 2. 
 94 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust, supra note 21, at 6. 
 95 In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 
MDL 2179, 2010 WL 3166434 (Aug. 10, 2010). 
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cases over the past decades. 
The most obvious of these issues is the so-called “contribution 
protection” issue. Feinberg and GCCF have been severely criticized for 
requiring that a Final Payment from the Trust be considered a complete 
resolution of the claim, except for personal injury claims. A Final 
Payment is a “complete and final resolution of all claims for past, 
current, or future losses that a Claimant has or may have with regard to 
the Deepwater Horizon incident and oil spill against BP and all other 
potentially liable parties.”96 Why does the GCCF require that a settling 
claimant release not only BP but also Transocean, Halliburton, and all 
other potentially liable parties? The problem is that a claimant’s separate 
litigation against other potentially liable parties might well involve BP 
and GCCF. Once sued, Transocean and Halliburton will likely implead 
BP and GCCF into the litigation through third-party practice by way of 
claims for indemnification and contribution.97 This was a serious 
problem under the original version of CERCLA because the liability 
provisions of the statute did not address the issue. In the infamous 
Seymour settlement, the United States had to agree in advance to reduce 
its judgment against a nonsettlor to the extent necessary to eliminate any 
contribution claims the nonsettlor might have against the settling 
defendant.98 
However, in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
of 1986, Congress added CERCLA section 113(f), which provides, “A 
person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for 
claims for contribution for matters addressed in the settlement. Such 
settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable parties 
unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of others 
by the amount of the settlement.”99 OPA, like the original version of 
CERCLA, does not address the contribution protection issue. As a result, 
the only way for BP to extinguish litigation with a claimant is to have the 
claimant release not only BP but also other potentially liable parties for 
matters addressed in the settlement. 
The “contribution protection” provision in the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) was part of 
 96 Gulf Coast Claims Facility Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 26, ¶ IV.B. 
 97 FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). 
 98 United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334, 1347-48 (S.D. Ind. 1982). 
 99 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(2) (Westlaw 2011). Note that the precise terms of this provision, 
drafted by the government in a self-centered way, do not address claims by private parties for 
response costs under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B). See id. 
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DOJ’s CERCLA litigation strategy. That strategy was to assert joint and 
several liability in any CERCLA case as a means to avoid becoming 
involved in the complex matter of allocating equitable responsibility 
among all potentially liable persons. To the extent that the United States 
is able to convince a court that a party is jointly and severally liable, it 
can recover all costs and damages from that party without regard to how 
they are ultimately allocated in contribution actions. The “contribution 
protection” provision protects not only the settling party, but also the 
government as plaintiff from involvement in comparative fault matters 
central to these contribution actions. Interestingly, DOJ adopts the same 
litigation strategy with respect to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. In its 
complaint filed on December 15, 2010, the United States asserts the joint 
and several liability of each defendant in the action: BP Exploration and 
Production, Inc., Anadarko Exploration and Production LLC, Moex 
Offshore 2007 LLC, Triton Asset Leasing GMBH, Transocean Holdings 
LLC, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., and QBE 
Underwriting Ltd., Lloyd’s Syndicate 1036.100 
Under the normal operation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the strategy of the United States to avoid entanglement with allocation 
among jointly and severally liable defendants would be unsuccessful, 
because no final judgment is entered in a case until all claims in the 
action, including contribution actions, are resolved.101 The United States 
has to wait for their resolution. Nonetheless, SARA also added, at the 
government’s behest, an unusual provision that expressly allows a court 
to bifurcate claims and to enter a declaratory judgment applicable in a 
subsequent action for future costs.102 
The absence of these types of provisions in OPA is likely to present 
the same kinds of difficulties that existed under the original version of 
CERCLA. Defendants such as BP, which are unlikely to have plausible 
defenses to liability or cannot apply the joint-and-several principle, will 
seek an allocation of responsibility among liable parties before entry of 
judgment in the government’s suit.103 The government will vociferously 
argue the contrary so that it may collect billions from BP without 
implicating itself in the liability and allocation disputes involving other 
defendants it has sued or third-party defendants identified by BP and 
 100 United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., filed Dec. 15, 2010, available at 
docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/louisiana/laedce/2:2010cv04536/144523/1/. 
 101 See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 102 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(2) (Westlaw 2011). 
 103 Halliburton may have plausible defenses to joint and several liability but not to nominal 
liability based on their due care. See Halliburton Disputes Commission Report Questioning Stability 
of BP Well Cementing, 209 DAILY ENV’T REP. (BNA) A-9 (Nov. 1, 2010). 
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others. A court wishing to expedite the resolution of all Deepwater 
Horizon claims, as opposed to simply expediting the government’s 
recovery, may delay entry of judgment to force all the parties to resolve 
allocation and other common issues. Efficiency from the government’s 
point of view is not necessarily the same as efficiency from the court’s 
perspective. 
V. COMPETITION OF FEDERAL, STATE AND PRIVATE CLAIMS 
Ultimately, an even larger complexity of the Deepwater Horizon 
litigation reminiscent of CERCLA litigation is the competition for BP’s 
funds among the federal government, states, and other claimants. The 
federal government’s December 2010 claim is not only for cleanup costs 
and damages, but also for civil penalties. The National Commission on 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling recommended 
that eighty percent of any penalties assessed for the spill go to ecosystem 
restoration.104 Commission staff also recommended that the government 
and responsible parties consider restoration of consumer confidence—
notably, in Gulf seafood and tourism—as an appropriate place to allocate 
funding when calculating fines and settlements.105 These penalties 
recognize that indirect economic losses are not covered by the 
compensation requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.106 At the 
same time, commissioners expressed much concern about 
recommendations in light of what companies can afford.107 
The Commission’s recommendations are reminiscent of earlier 
environmental disasters where comprehensive judicial settlements 
included various environmental projects. For example, the Allied Kepone 
settlement led to the creation of the Virginia Environmental 
Endowment.108 In 2010, BP moved aggressively outside the context of 
 104 Oil Spill Panel Moves Plan to Use 80 Percent of Penalties for Gulf Restoration, 232 
DAILY ENV’T REP.A-10 (Dec. 6, 2010); see generally Carrie Presnall, Laura López-Hoffman, & 
Marc L. Miller, Can the Deepwater Horizon Trust Take Account of Ecosystem Services and Fund 
Restoration of the Gulf?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,129 (2010), available at 
www.eli.org/pdf/NA_40-11/40.11129.pdf. 
 105 Oil Spill Panel Moves Plan to Use 80 Percent of Penalties for Gulf Restoration, 232 
DAILY ENV’T REP.A-10 (Dec. 6, 2010). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id.; see also Oil Spill Restoration Chief Says Penalties Should Support Gulf Coast Cleanup 
Projects, 25 TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 1008 (2010) (stating that Navy Secretary Ray Mabus released 
Sept. 28 report asking Congress to amend Clean Water Act to divert “significant funds” from the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund to Gulf of Mexico restoration projects). 
 108 See Martin Harrell, Organizational Environmental Crime and the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984: Combining Fines with Restitution, Remedial Orders, Community Service, and Probation to 
Benefit the Environment While Punishing the Guilty, 6 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 290 n.55 (1995); 
18
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol5/iss1/5
04_LIGHT PRINTER VERSION 9/26/2011  9:11:25 PM 
2011] OIL SPILL TRUST AND CLAIMS FACILITY 105 
 
the GCCF to voluntarily fund oil-spill-related efforts. Beginning in May 
2010, BP paid the State of Florida millions of dollars to promote tourism 
in the Gulf area and throughout the state.109 BP also paid private claims 
such as those by Virginia’s oyster industry for loss of one source of its 
supply.110 As to any penalty settlement, an agreement between the 
government and responsible parties is not necessarily dispositive. The 
Center for Biological Diversity has filed a citizen suit against BP and the 
government, seeking penalties of $4,300 per barrel of oil spilled, which 
is upwards of $20 billion, under the Clean Water Act.111 
The potential wild card in the Deepwater Horizon litigation arises 
out of the government’s criminal investigation into the disaster. As of 
January 2011, the DOJ has not filed criminal charges in connection with 
the disaster, but doing so will vastly complicate resolution of the 
numerous civil claims.112 As environmental lawyers know, DOJ 
separates its criminal and civil enforcement litigators, and the presence 
of an ongoing criminal case makes civil discovery more difficult since 
witnesses face the risk of incarceration based on their testimony. Often, 
civil settlement negotiations are delayed until a criminal investigation is 
concluded. Similarly, DOJ also separates its environmental enforcement 
and environmental defense functions. It is likely that DOJ’s 
environmental defense group will not be able to avoid its ultimate 
involvement in the BP litigation. After Hurricane Andrew, a federal 
judge permitted a plaintiff’s suit against the Army Corps of Engineers to 
proceed on the theory that the failure of its flood-control projects created 
monetary damages for which the United States was liable, the 
“discretionary function” exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act to the 
James W. Radig, Corporate Contributions to Charity as a Condition of Probation Under the Federal 
Probation Act, 9 J. CORP. L. 241, 247 (1984). 
 109 On May 20, BP agreed in a Memorandum of Understanding with Florida officials to pay 
$25 million for Florida’s emergency marketing campaign to preserve the state’s tourism industry and 
an extra $10 million for marketing support in impact counties. Agreement between Douglas J. 
Suttler, CEO of BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., and David Holstead, Florida Division of Emergency 
Management (May 20, 2010). 
 110 Pamela A. D’Angelo, Northern Neck Oyster Houses Share Pain of BP Oil Spill, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 26, 2010. 
 111 In re: Deepwater Horizon, No. 10-2454 (E.D. La., filed Aug. 4, 2010); see also Center for 
Biological Diversity v. BP America, Inc., No. 10-1768 (E.D. La., filed June 18, 2010). 
 112 A criminal prosecution is widely expected. See e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 69, at 1417; 
John Schwartz, With Criminal Charges, Costs to BP Could Soar, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, 
available at www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/us/17liability.html?ref=johnschwartz; Marisa Taylor, 
Criminal Charges Likely from Gulf Oil Spill, Legal Experts Say, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (May 
12, 2010), www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/12/94061/federal-laws-point-to-criminal.html; Justice 
Department Probes Spill; Charges Expected, NPR MORNING EDITION (June 9, 2010), 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127586497. 
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contrary notwithstanding.113 It remains to be seen whether the failure of 
governmental oversight alleged in the Deepwater Horizon disaster will 
produce similar theories of government liability.114 
Therefore, it is in the interest of the government to negotiate a plea 
agreement with BP “prior to indictment or shortly thereafter.”115 Even if 
criminal liability is available under existing law, establishing liability by 
proving ordinary negligence, in light of the likely non-intentional nature 
of BP’s misconduct, may spur Congress to “consider limiting criminal 
liability for ordinary negligence to cases of endangerment . . . or cases 
that involve substantial harm to the environment (like the Gulf oil spill), 
and should otherwise require at least criminal negligence or recklessness 
for criminal prosecution.”116 Even then, the “concern is that the 
egregiousness of the harm will divert attention from the culpability of the 
underlying conduct.”117 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
The Gulf Coast Claims Facility has evolved since its creation in 
June 2010. Feinberg originally invoked the Superfund myth – a regime 
for quick compensation of claimants damaged by the oil spill without the 
need for the expense or assistance of lawyers. However, he received a 
firestorm of criticism when it became apparent that the Facility wished to 
resolve and liquidate claims, rather than pay them on an open-ended 
basis, and required documentation of damages and their connection to 
the oil spill as a prerequisite to final settlement. This led to a retooling of 
the Facility in late 2010 to permit, as an alternative to final liquidation, a 
continuation of interim claims for persons who had convinced the 
Facility to the extent of obtaining prior interim payments.118 This quick-
pay option is narrow – interim payments after 2010 were quarterly 
retroactive payments based on losses from the prior quarter, not for 
 113 Robinson v. United States (In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig.), 471 F. Supp. 2d 
684 (E.D. La. 2007); see In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 628-29, 
637-39 (E.D. La. 2008). 
 114 See Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to Be 
a Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,033, 11,037 (2010) (alleging “willful 
blindness”); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the 
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the 
Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,041 (2010). 
 115 Uhlmann, supra note 69, at 1418. 
 116 Id. at 1458. 
 117 Id. at 1460. 
 118 BP Spill Compensation Fund Moves into Next Phase, Offering Two Options, 226 DAILY 
ENV’T REP. (BNA) A-7 (Nov. 26, 2010). 
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losses in the upcoming month as with the prior emergency payments 
system. Feinberg saw the need for this option in light of the large number 
of claimants that lacked adequate documentation of their claims to justify 
final settlements.119 
The paucity of claims paid by the end of 2010 also gave Feinberg 
the flexibility to offer, as he did in December 2010, to pay attorney’s fees 
for any claimants who wanted legal representation in connection with 
their claims.120 Exactly how this fee-shifting will work and how much it 
might cost the Trust remained unclear at the end of 2010.121 With 
discovery in the Multidistrict Litigation scheduled to commence in 
January 2011, the focus of attention may be on claims outside the scope 
of the GCCF, like the government’s response costs, natural resource 
damages, and penalty claims, rather than those of private individuals and 
businesses that could have files claims against the GCCF in 2010.122 
Even where the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust may serve as the 
source of payment for very large claims, such as those of states and local 
governments for natural resources damages, the GCCF has disclaimed 
jurisdiction.123 On the other hand, Judge Barbier, who is handling the 
Multidistrict Litigation, has asserted jurisdiction over some of these 
claims, refusing to permit their adjudication elsewhere.124 Ironically, the 
less Feinberg pays for interim claims, final settlements, and 
administrative costs, the more BP will have available from the $20 
billion Trust for governmental claims outside the scope of the GCCF. If a 
large balance remains in the Trust, it could be a substitute for the much 
smaller Oil Pollution Liability Trust Fund. In this sense, at least, maybe 
Superfund is less of a myth than it might otherwise appear. 
Nonetheless, the law of unintended consequences appears in many 
places related to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster. Especially in the early 
 119 Video: Feinberg Says Quick-Pay Option for BP Claims “Very Fair,” BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
14, 2010), www.bloomberg.com/video/65253264/. 
 120 Id. (“BP will pay the costs of the pro bono program so that any claimant can have a 
lawyer.”). 
 121 Id. 
 122 See Judge Says Written, Deposition Discovery in Multidistrict Litigation to Begin in 
January, 225 DAILY ENV’T REP. (BNA) A-9 (Nov. 24, 2010). 
 123 See Lee, supra note 1; see also Light, supra note 1. 
 124 Louisiana Suit Against BP to Remain Part of Multidistrict Litigation, 25 TOXICS L. REP. 
(BNA) 1064 (Oct, 14, 2010). As of January 2011, however, the states continue to argue before Judge 
Barbier that he should separate their cases from those brought on behalf of individuals and 
businesses. Amanda Bronstad, States Seek Distance from Other BP Plaintiffs, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 17, 
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months after the blowout and largely for public relations purposes, BP 
and the GCCF compensated victims that were only remotely associated 
with spill. But the GCCF ultimately may not compensate many with 
larger claims, and those claimants might decide to take a ticket in the 
lawsuit lottery rather than rely on GCCF for a comprehensive settlement. 
GCCF’s continuation of interim payments during the winter of 2010 
suggests the law of unintended consequences of the original Trust design 
still persists. 
From a broader perspective, the nation’s renewed emphasis on 
government enforcement might “simply lead to more government 
workers without a concomitant increase in safety as captive regulators 
play golf and dine out with their industry counterparts.”125 According to 
the Wall Street Journal, stock investors perceive the identification of 
systemic problems in oil exploration as lessening the extent of specific 
responsibility for BP.126 The interaction of corporate law, international 
law, and environmental regulation surely complicates the situation. As 
the government pushes its case for criminal sanctions, that action may 
delay justice for those who choose to pursue civil actions for damages, 
because to the extent “we make the firm pay for every dime of damages, 
our efforts may trigger a bankruptcy that results in lower compensation 
to victims.”127 Even without such direct conflicts, the inevitable 
limitation of resources available to address this matter ultimately exposes 
the competition for those resources among (1) individuals and businesses 
allegedly damaged in an economic sense, (2) those in the oil industry 
trying to produce the products upon which our economy relies, (3) 
government scientists seeking ecosystem restoration, and (4) prosecutors 
seeking retribution through criminal actions to “express societal outrage 
about the spill in ways that civil penalties cannot.”128 
Just as dispersants have hidden much of the real spill below the 
surface, the ultimate role of the GCCF in compensating victims may be 
known only after we see how the complex components of that system 
(government and private lawsuits, comprehensive settlements, restoration 
of the Gulf oil, fishing, and tourism industries) play out and interact. In 
other words, we are still seeing more of the myth than the reality of the 
GCCF. 
 
 125 Helwege, supra note 30, at 7. 
 126 See Chazan, supra note 67. 
 127 Helwege, supra note 30, at 7; see also supra notes 112-117. 
 128 Uhlmann, supra note 69, at 1461. 
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